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NOTES AND COMMENTS




The uniqueness of the death penalty as a punishment can only be
justified by the incomparability of murder as a crime. According to opin-
ion polls, a significant percentage of Americans still believe that capital
punishment is society's appropriate response to murder.' However, with
fourteen states having completely outlawed capital punishment, whether
the states impose it is strictly a matter of legislative enactment.
2
The United States Constitution, mandating that the states rationally
administer the death penalty in a way that is neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious, has provided the primary restraints.3 These restraints are most
notably embodied in the eighth amendment outlawing cruel and unusual
punishment4 and the fourteenth amendment affording every criminal de-
fendant due process of law.5
In abiding by these constitutional mandates, those states retaining
capital punishment should endeavor, through their courts and legisla-
tures, to insure there is always a valid penological objective served in
1. Petitioner's Brief at 29 n.8, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169).
See also Gersten, The Constitionality of Executing Juvenile Offenders: Thompson v. Oklahoma, 24
CRiM. L BULL. 91, 114-15 (1988). Gersten mentions that a 1965 Gallup poll indicated 45% of
respondents favored capital punishment for murder. Id.
2. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2694 n.25 (1988) (Alaska, District of Colum-
bia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin do not have valid death penalty statutes). Id.
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 409 U.S.
902 (1979). In Furman, the Court struck down a death penalty which was imposed in an arbitrary
and capricious manner as a violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. For further discus-
sion, see infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." Id.
1
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selecting those few criminals who are to be executed.6 However, unfortu-
nately some states have failed to legislate adequate procedures adjusting
the legal system to account for youth, with its vulnerability and needs, as
a sufficiently mitigating circumstance.7
The Supreme Court has traditionally maintained that substantial
deference to the state legislatures and courts is, in a general sense, proper
with respect to the death penalty.8 In Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 decided
in 1988, the Court came close to discarding this principle and specifying
a national minimum age of sixteen at the time of the crime, under which
the death penalty could not be imposed. Since Thompson, the Court in
Stanford v. Kentucky, t° has clarified a position in concluding that imposi-
tion of capital punishment on an offender for a crime committed at six-
teen or seventeen years of age does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment."I A majority of the Court
agreed that the primary objective indicator, that is, a national consensus
favoring a minimum age, was missing.' 2  Therefore, in Thompson, the
plurality, which was bent on establishing a national bright line age mini-
mum, has been checked in its attempt to set the minimum above sixteen
years of age.
Notwithstanding Stanford, the Supreme Court will again become
embroiled in the central issue of Thompson, namely the desirability of
stipulating a national minimum age for imposition of the death penalty,
whatever that age might be. Objective indicators, argued both ways in
6. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984). "Ifa State has determined that death should
be an available penalty for certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a way that can
rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those
for whom it is not." Id. Accord Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2700 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
plurality); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-77 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89
(1982).
7. Only three states, Delaware, Oklahoma, and South Dakota have neither a minimum age
nor a requirement for age as a mitigating factor.
8. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983).
9. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
10. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). This case represented the consolidation of two actions. The first
petitioner, Stanford, was 17 years and four months old at the time he committed murder in Ken-
tucky. During a robbery, Stanford and an accomplice repeatedly raped and sodomized a female gas
station attendant. Stanford shot her point-blank in the face, and then in the back of the head. At
trial, the sentencing jury was instructed that petitioner's age and the possibility of rehabilitation were
mitigating factors. The second petitioner, Wilkins, was 16 years and six months old at the time he
committed murder in Missouri. Wilkins, during a robbery, repeatedly stabbed a convenience store
owner in the chest as she begged for her life, and then sliced her carotid artery and left her to die.
The opinion did not indicate if the trial court considered youth as a mitigating circumstance. The
Missouri statute requires such consideration so it can only be presumed that it was given.
11. Id. at 2976-77.
12. Id. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 25:115
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Thompson and further analyzed here, support handling the juvenile
death penalty issue at the state level. 3 Given (1) the lack of any discern-
able pattern of state laws showing a settled consensus against executing
young offenders, 4 (2) the fact that the predominant scientific theory of
adolescent maturation does not identify precise transitional periods, 5
and (3) the existence of a significant minority of states rejecting such a
bright line,' 6 the Court has adhered to its deference policy on the bright
line issue. Nevertheless, states refusing to enact legislation directing
criminal courts to treat youth as a highly relevant mitigating factor1 7 in
the death penalty sentencing process are now apparently under charge to
do so. According to the Court, such treatment is in keeping with "evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of [contemporary
society].""'
13. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality) (citing Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635, reh'g denied,
444 U.S. 887 (1979)).
14. See infra notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
16. A total of nineteen states have authorized capital punishment but have not expressed a
minimum age of sixteen in either their juvenile court waiver statutes or death penalty statutes. The
nineteen states and their specific statutory provisions are: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to 13A-5-59 and
13A-6-2 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (14 year-old waiver in § 12-15-34(a)); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
703 to 13-706 and 13-1105 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (youth listed as mitigating factor in § 13-703(G)(5));
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-4-104(b) and 5-4-601 to 5-4-617 and 5-10-101 and 5-51-201 (1987) (14 year-
old minimum established through concurrent jurisdiction under § 5-4-617(1)(2)); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 636 and 4209 (1979 & Supp. 1986) (no minimum age and no requirement for age as a
mitigating factor); FLA. STAT. §§ 775.02 and 782.04(1) and 921.141 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (youth
listed as mitigating factor in § 921.141(6)(g)); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4001 to 18-4004 and 19-2515
(1987 & Supp. 1989) (14 year-old minimum established through concurrent jurisdiction under § 16-
1806A(1))); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30 and 14:113 (West 1986) (15 year-old minimum estab-
lished through concurrent jurisdiction under § 13:1570(A)(5)); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-21, 97-7-
67 and 99-19-101 to 99-19-107 (1987) (13 year-old waiver in § 43-21-151); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 565.020 and 565.030 to 565.040 (1987) (14 year-old waiver in § 211.071)); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 45-5-102 and 46-18-301 to 46-18-310 (1987) (12 year-old waiver in § 41-5-206); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, §§ 701.10-701.15 (1981 & Supp. 1988) (no minimum age or requirement for youth as a mitigat-
ingfactor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(a) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (14
year-old minimum established through exclusive jurisdiction under 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6355(a)(1),(e) (1985)); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10 and 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1986)
(youth listed as mitigating factor in § 16-3-20(c)(b)(7)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-16-4 and
22-16-12 to 23A-27A-41 (1979 & Supp. 1987) (no minimum age and no requirement for youth as a
mitigating factor); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206 and 76-3-207 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (14 year-old
waiver in § 78-3(a)-25(1)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2303 and 2403, and 7101 to'7107 (1974 &
Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31 and 19.2-264.2 to 19.2-264.5 (1983 & Supp. 1987) (15 year-
old waiver in § 16.1-269(a)); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.010 and 10.95.900 (1987) (youth listed as
a mitigating circumstance in § 10.95.070); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to 6-2-103 (1983) (youth listed as
a mitigating circumstance in § 6-21020)(vii)).
17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
18. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
3
Petersen: Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Mitigating Circumstance of Youthful Cap
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Juvenile Justice
Along with the individual freedoms that Americans enjoy some-
times comes a price. Those so inclined may engage in violent crime and
often escape apprehension, much less a punishment commensurate with
the pain and suffering which their victims must endure. This is the pri-
mary reason why punishment, especially as applied to youth, will never
effectively deter such violence. 9
The family was and still is normally thought to have the primary
responsibility for a child's welfare.2" Only after the family has totally
failed does the state assume that responsibility.2" Out of a spirit of pater-
nalism and with a hope toward rehabilitating such children,22 the states
first began to establish juvenile court systems in 1899.23 The courts' phi-
losophy was premised on the twin goals of protecting children from
themselves, where society had failed them, and isolating them from the
harsh criminal sanctions imposed by the adult courts.2 4 However, one
unfortunate result of paternalism was that children, unlike their adult
counterparts, were unable to challenge effectively the state's authority
over them. For example, the arresting officer was normally called upon
to present the state's evidence against the child. 26 Finally, the Supreme
Court constitutionalized this socialized system in 1967 by returning to
juvenile offenders the criminal court procedural protections which the
juvenile court system had once denied them.27
Notwithstanding that children were and still are considered to hold
a "special place" in society,28 most states have largely rejected the idea of
rehabilitating juveniles who have committed more serious or heinous
crimes.29 These states have seen fit to forego benevolent treatment when
19. V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 189 (1987).
20. See generally Gersten, supra note 1, at 93-94 n.18. Gersten disagrees with the parens pa-
triae doctrine of the English Court of Chancery which maintains that when a child is at risk, the
appropriate authority to decide what is in the child's best interest is the state.
21. Gersten, supra note 1, at 93-94 n. 18.
22. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 3-4.
23. Gersten, supra note 1, at 94.
24. Gersten, supra note 1, at 95.
25. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 5.
26. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 5.
27. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 5 (citing In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which marked the
beginning of the constitutionalized era).
28. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also In re
Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-15 (1967).
29. Note, Executing Youthful Offenders: The Unanswered Question in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 471, 479-81 (1985).
[Vol. 25:115
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a juvenile offender has committed murder, rape, robbery, or other serious
crimes.3" Because the juvenile justice system must release the offender
when he or she reaches the age of majority, the system allows little time
for the extended and intensive rehabilitation programs required for seri-
ous youthful offenders.3" Understandably, the states have been unwilling
to expedite release of these probable repeat felons back into society. The
adult criminal courts will typically administer the full range of adult
criminal sentences to young offenders, with the qualified exception of
capital punishment.3" Most recently, the Supreme Court has tasked the
states to weigh youth as a "highly relevant" mitigating factor to be con-
sidered during the young murderer's sentencing process.
33
B. Cruel and Unusual
The eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
'34
The Supreme Court has therefore interpreted cruel and unusual punish-
ment in a flexible and dynamic manner in "light of contemporary human
knowledge."3 The founding fathers viewed the amendment as prohibit-
ing "tortures" and "barbarous" methods of punishment; moreover, the
earlier Supreme Court decisions appear to support that view.36 Today,
the eighth amendment generally limits certain types of punishment and
prohibits punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime.37
More recently, the Court's exemption of rape as a crime punishable
by death set one parameter on capital punishment as cruel and unusual. 38
30. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 9.
31. Gasper & Katkin, A Rationale for the Abolition of the Juvenile Court's Power to Waive
Jurisdiction, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 937, 938 (1980).
32. V. STREW, supra note 19, at 9.
33. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1982). Although the Court reversed the case
due to the sentencing court's failure to consider the youth's background and mental and emotional
development, the Court nevertheless emphasized that "age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating
factor of great weight."Id.
34. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
35. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
36. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-71, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). The conclusion
that the framers were primarily concerned with tortures can be gleaned from the debates in the state
conventions called to ratify the Constitution. Id. at 170 n.17.
37. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (eighth
amendment prohibits unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 367 (1910) (punishment must be relative to the severity of the crime).
38. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (nationwide jury sentencing and legislative attitudes
strongly rejected death as a disproportionate punishment for rape, Georgia having been the only
state with a death penalty statute for rape).
1989]
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The Court concluded that death was "grossly disproportionate and ex-
cessive punishment for the crime of rape."39 However, setting parame-
ters based on types of crime is a far simpler task than selecting classes of
persons who might qualify for special treatment based on reduced culpa-
bility. Given the widely varying maturity levels of adolescents, 40 those
states having drawn a bright line based on the chronological age of young
murderers have overly simplified the sentencing process. The Supreme
Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,4 reaffirmed another eighth amendment pa-
rameter by declaring murder a crime deserving of the death penalty.
This landmark decision specified the aggravating circumstance that a
murder must be" 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved... [the] depravity of [the] mind' " of the defendant, to be
deserving of the death penalty.42
With respect to capital punishment for youthful offenders, the
Supreme Court has primarily looked to "history and precedent, legisla-
tive attitudes, and the response of juries" to best gauge the evolving stan-
dard.43 There is well settled precedent under both American and English
law for executing young murderers.' Even though minors have been
increasingly involved in violent crime,45 and should somehow be held
legally responsible, the Supreme Court has generally perceived the harsh-
ness of the death penalty as often inappropriate.46 Furthermore, the ex-
treme infrequency of juvenile executions indicates a strong national
disfavor toward them.47
III. THOMPSON V OKLAHOMA
A. Leading Up To Thompson v. Oklahoma
Even though capital punishment was widely accepted at the time,
39. Id. at 592.
40. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
41. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
42. Id. at 201.
43. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
44. See Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1471, 1475 (1983). See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23-24
(1850).
45. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
46. See ag., Id. at 116; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (youth was mentioned as a
mitigating circumstance); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273 (1976) (a sentencing jury "could further
look to the age of the defendant").
47. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25:115
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abolitionists won a partial victory in the 1972 Furman v. Georgia rul-
ing.a" Although Georgia's death penalty statutes were struck down by
the Court as imposing capital punishment in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, Furman came short of declaring capital punishment unconstitu-
tional.4 9 Nevertheless, the states declared an unofficial moratorium on
its imposition until 1976.50
Shortly thereafter and to the abolitionists' dismay, the Court held, in
Gregg v. Georgia,51 that capital punishment was not a per se violation of
the eighth amendment.52 The Court still found a national consensus re-
garding the death penalty as "an appropriate and necessary criminal
sanction."53 However, before a judge or jury may impose a death sen-
tence, there has to be a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of at least one
of ten aggravating circumstances specified in Georgia's death penalty
statute.54 This was also the first time the Court mentioned youth as a
relevant mitigating factor to be considered during sentencing.55
In Lockett v. Ohio,5 6 the Court had more to say about the relevance
of youth. The Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration of
three mitigating factors, none of which was youth. 57 This landmark deci-
sion held that not only must the circumstances of the crime be taken into
account, but the character and propensities of the offender as well. 58 The
Ohio statute was therefore ruled unconstitutional because it precluded
48. 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
49. Id. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred that the death penalty was per se cruel
and unusual punishment.
50. The first state to break the moratorium was North Carolina in Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976). There, the death penalty had been imposed for first degree murder committed
during a bank robbery. A statute made the death sentence mandatory for all first degree murders.
The Supreme Court held that aspects of the character of the offender and circumstances of the crime
are always to be considered in the sentencing process. Thus, the mandatory death penalty statute
was ruled unconstitutional.
51. 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
52. Id. at 169.
53. Id. at 179.
54. Id. at 164-66. Examples of some of these aggravating circumstances included "murder,
rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping [that] was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." Id. at 165-66 n.9.
This was the aggravating circumstance under which Thompson was sentenced.
55. Id. at 197.
56. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
57. Id. at 608. The Ohio statute precluding consideration of any mitigating factors when certain
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consideration of a defendant's minor role, or age, as affecting the sentenc-
ing decision. 9 In the companion case to Lockett, Bell v. Ohio,6" the mur-
derer was sixteen at the time of the crime. The Court avoided addressing
the youth issue and simply reversed the death sentence because Bell had
been convicted under the same unconstitutional Ohio statute. 6I
Oklahoma's juvenile death penalty sentencing procedures have
come to the attention of the United States Supreme Court on two recent
occasions.6" In both instances, the youth of the offender was at issue. In
1982, the Court granted certiorari on the issue of age in Eddings v.
Oklahoma.63 At the age of sixteen, Monty Lee Eddings had killed a po-
lice officer. He was subsequently charged and plead nolo contendere.64
At the sentencing hearing, the judge gave much consideration to Ed-
dings' youth, but failed to consider his troubled past, severe mental and
psychological impairments, and his violent and unhappy background.65
The judge sentenced Eddings to death.
The anticipation was that the Court would consider whether the ex-
ecution of juvenile murderers is cruel and unusual punishment, but in-
stead the Court reversed the death sentence because the sentencer did not
consider all the mitigating evidence as required by Lockett.66 Some com-
mentators view the decision as exhibiting almost complete irresolve on
the constitutional issue.67 They imply that only an age-based constitu-
tional bar could adequately address the issue. More realistically, the Ed-
dings Court would have been hard-pressed to draw that bright line for
two reasons: (1) the Court lacked any convincing empirical evidence and
59. Id.
60. 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
61. Id. at 642-43.
62. The Supreme Court found Oklahoma's capital punishment sentencing procedures in viola-
tion of the eighth and fourteenth amendments in both Thompson and Eddings.
63. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 108-09.
66. Id. at 117.
67. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett, the Court reversed the death sentence.
The Ohio statute included only three mitigating factors whereas the Court ruled that sentencers
must consider any relevant mitigating factor or personal characteristic as a possible basis for a sen-
tence less than death. Id. at 604. The Court did later address youth:
But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is
replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly 'during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment' expected of adults.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635,
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979)) (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 25:115
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data required to decide the issue; and (2) there was a lack of Supreme
Court dicta and precedent on the issue.68
B. The Facts
At the time of Charles Keene's death, Wayne Thompson was only
fifteen years old, the youngest member of four co-defendants, and the
only minor.6 9 On the night of the murder, Thompson had told his girl-
friend that he was leaving with his brother to kill his former brother-in-
law Charles.7" Keene had been repeatedly beating Thompson's sister
Vicki.7 Upon returning home, Thompson related that he had killed
Charles Keene and that Vicki did not have to worry about him
anymore.72
Keene was beaten in a neighbor's front yard while he shouted franti-
cally to be let into the house.73 He was ultimately shot in the head and
chest, and his chest, throat, and stomach had been cut.7 4 The four co-
defendants then chained the body to a concrete block and threw it in the
river.75 All four co-defendants were tried separately and each received
the death penalty.76 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
Thompson's sentence,77 and the United States Supreme Court later took
the case on a writ of certiorari.78
C. Three Opinions
The plurality of Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
indicated that they granted certiorari to consider whether (1) the death
sentence was cruel and unusual punishment for a crime committed by a
boy of fifteen, and whether (2) erroneously admitted photographs of the
68. In cases prior to Eddings, the Supreme Court said very little about the juvenile death pen-
alty, in dicta or otherwise, indicating the Court's general avoidance of the youth issue regarding
imposition of the death penalty. Thus, there is little precedent upon which to decree a minimum age
for imposing the death penalty.
69. Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2687
(1988).
70. Id. at 783.
71. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2712 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2687
(1988).
73. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2712 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2712-13.
75. Id. at 2712.
76. Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 782 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2687
(1988).
77. Id. at 786.
78. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
1989]
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victim were prejudicial at the penalty stage.79
In confronting the first question, the plurality stated that nationally,
legislative enactments indicated an intolerance toward juvenile execu-
tions. ° It further alluded to prohibitions in other western nations and
the abolitionist stands taken by various professional organizations. 8I
Furthermore, with only 0.3% of those under sixteen who were arrested
for willful criminal homicide receiving the death penalty,82 the plurality
suggested that these freakish judicial determinations were cruel and unu-
sual.83 The plurality could not find sufficient culpability in the criminal
behavior of a fifteen-year-old whom it deemed to lack the capacity to
control his or her conduct.84 Finally, the plurality concluded that juve-
nile executions do not contribute to the social purposes of capital punish-
ment, namely retribution and deterrence." The plurality then drew the
79. In a split decision, a plurality of three justices concluded that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments prohibited execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of the
offense and that the photographs taken of the dead body were inflammatory, constituting error.
Three justices dissented to both conclusions. One justice concurred in the judgment to vacate judg-
ment and remand the case.
80. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2692-96 (1988). The plurality buttressed its argu-
ment by pointing out the fact that all states have enacted various status laws which differentiate
according to age. Its opinion included five pages of appendices listing voting, jury service, driving,
marriage, pornographic material purchase, and legalized gambling statutes and constitutional provi-
sions. The idea is if the states differentiate by age in these areas, why not differentiate by age on the
life or death issue of capital punishment. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text for a cri-
tique of this line of reasoning. The Court also listed the 31 states which statutorily prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty for murders committed while under the age of 16. These prohibi-
tions are derived from either absolute prohibitions on capital punishment or are reflected in mini-
mum age statutes. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text for further discussion.
81. Id. at 2696. The plurality referred to several previous rulings where it had recognized the
views of the international community. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text. The plurality
also noted that the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute oppose the death
penalty for juveniles. Actually, eight amicus curiae briefs were filed with the Court in support of the
petition.
82. Id. at 2697 n.39.
83. Id. at 2697-98. In quoting Furman, the Court actually characterized the sentences as
"cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. (citing
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (Stewart, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972)).
84. Id. at 2698. The plurality referred to a passage from the 1978 Report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders from which Justice Powell
had quoted in the Eddings v. Oklahoma decision:
Adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable,
more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be
just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less pun-
ishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think
in long range terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the
offender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the
social system, which share responsibility for the development of America's youth.
Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
85. Id. at 2699.
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line at sixteen years of age at the time of the offense,86 and having re-
solved the first question found it unnecessary to address the second.87
The dissent consisted of Justices Scalia, White, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. The dissent rejected even the suggestion of a bright line as an
implausible interpretation of the Constitution.88 It warned that the risk
of assessing evolving standards, as the plurality managed to do, is that
such assessments often culminate in one's own views.89 The dissent con-
sidered international opinion irrelevant to this constitutional issue.90 Its
remedy was to defer to the legislature as the objective sign of modern
society's consensus.9" Whereas the plurality emphasized the thirty-one
states having either outlawed capital punishment altogether or having
instituted age limitation statutes, the dissent emphasized that the remain-
ing nineteen states without such a statute negate a consensus.92 The dis-
sent also perceived the drastic reduction in executions of persons
committing crimes while under the age of sixteen as a reflection of a
general reduction in public support for capital punishment and the exer-
cise of executive clemency.93 Finally, the dissent attacked the plurality
for its abiding conviction that none of the death penalty rationales apply
to juvenile offenders.94
Justice O'Connor partly concurred and partly dissented. She agreed
86. Id. at 2700.
87. Id. at 2700 n.48.
88. Id. at 2714 (dissenting opinion). The dissent denounced the plurality's conclusion that it is
"a fundamental principle of our society that no one who is as little as one day short of his 16th
birthday can have sufficient maturity and moral responsibility to be subjected to capital punishment
for any crime," this being a "sociological and moral conclusion that is implausible; and it is doubly
implausible as an interpretation of the United States Constitution:" Id.
89. Id. at 2715.
90. Id. at 2716 n.4. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text for expanded discussion of
international opinion.
91. Id. at 2715-16. The dissent identified legislative enactments as one objective sign of how
society views a particular punishment.
92. Id. at 2716. See infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text for expanded discussion of legis-
lative enactments regarding capital offenses.
93. Id. at 2717. The dissent contested the plurality's contention that all of the eighteen to
twenty pre-1948 executions of offenders who were below the age of sixteen when they committed
crimes is persuasive evidence of an enlightened social attitude. The dissent succinctly claimed it is a
mistake to discern such a consensus by referring to an earlier analogous situation:
[Iln 1927 when, despite a level of total executions almost five times higher than that of
the post-1950 period, there had been no execution for crime committed by juveniles under
the age of 16 for almost 17 years. That that did not reflect a new societal absolute was
demonstrated by the fact that in approximately the next 17 years there were 10 such
executions.
Id. (citing V. STREB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENtLES 191-208 (1987)).
94. Id. at 2719. The dissent attacked the plurality's "abiding conviction" that 'Ithe lesser
culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obliga-
tions to its children'" abrogated application of the death penalty rationales. The judgment as to
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with the plurality that there is a clear national legislative consensus out-
lawing capital punishment for fifteen-year-olds. 5 However, this percep-
tion alone did not persuade her that the Court must draw a bright line.
She dismissed the plurality's raw execution and sentencing statistics as
inadequate to establish a consensus.9 6 Most importantly, she remained
unconvinced that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpabil-
ity that might justify execution.97
Both the plurality and dissenting opinions repeat, for the most part,
the opposing arguments presented in the numerous briefs filed with the
Court. However, except for the judgment to vacate and remand, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion sided largely with the dissent. Most no-
tably, she asserted that: (1) the plurality never educed any evidence dem-
onstrating that fifteen-year-olds as a class are inherently incapable of
being deterred from major crimes by the prospect of the death penalty; 98
(2) in the absence of such evidence, it would be incorrect to substitute the
Supreme Court's "inevitably subjective judgment" as to the best age to
draw a line;99 (3) if a best-age decision were made based on a mistaken
premise, it would be "frozen into constitutional law" making it difficult
later to refute or reject;" and (4) there was no indication that any state
legislature had considered executing juveniles for murder committed
while under the age of sixteen.' 01
what the eighth amendment permits, according to the dissent, should not be dictated by the "per-
sonal consciences" ofthe Court. Rather, the dissent argued that its parameters are dictated by either
the "original understanding of 'cruel and unusual' . . . or because they come within current under-
standing of what is 'cruel and unusual,' because of the 'evolving standards of decency'...." The
Court is appointed to "discern rather than decree" these standards. Id.
95. Id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
96. Id. at 2708. Justice O'Connor stated that variables such as how many times juries have
been asked to impose the death penalty on juveniles and or how many times prosecutors have exer-
cised discretion in refraining from seeking the death penalty make sentencing statistics suspect. Id.
97. Id. at 2708.
98. Id. at 2708-09.
99. Id. at 2709.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2708. This last observation strongly suggests that legislatures having seriously con-
sidered the issue have consensually drawn bright lines ranging from fifteen to eighteen years of age.
There are only three state legislatures that have not seriously considered the issue, the rest having
either completely outlawed capital punishment, stipulated a minimum age, or established procedural
safeguards which have thus far immunized all offenders having committed crimes while under the
age of fifteen. Justice O'Connor objected to the plurality's attempt at "[p]lacing restraints upon the
manner in which the States make their laws, in order to give 15-year-old criminals special protection
against capital punishment" as "not ... an idea [that] is ours to impose." Id. at 2721 (dissenting
opinion).
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III. SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE BRIGHT LINE ISSUE
The reality of any crime, including juvenile crime, is that there are
innocent victims involved. The murderer perpetrates significant pain and
suffering on the collective victim: the actual victim, family, friends, and
society in general. In determining just what "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" are, the Thompson
plurality failed to address this collective victim. The plurality, in sub-
scribing to the evolutionary process theory, 0 2 addressed only the crimi-
nal as a possible beneficiary of any measure of "decency" which the
criminal justice system might extend. 0 3 However, because a retributive
element is still left in the death sentence, the system must be flexible
enough to afford the collective victim the assurance that a culpable mur-
derer is adequately punished," even if this means execution.
This discourse is not to say that the proper test is "an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth." Instead, the sentencer must properly balance the
rights of the collective victim against the offender's rights to humane
treatment under the law. The sentencer should weigh the young of-
fender's culpability and amenability to treatment and rehabilitation
against the needs to placate the collective victim and deter further crime.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has occasionally engaged in "propor-
tionality analysis" which examines whether there is a disproportion be-
tween the offender's punishment and his or her culpability, and whether
penological objectives are met. 10 5 In Stanford v. Kentucky, a plurality
stated that state laws and jury determinations must first evidence a socie-
tal consensus against the death penalty before proportionality analysis
can be applied.' 06 However, because five justices rejected this rule, the
102. Id. at 2691 n.4 (plurality opinion). Here, the plurality characterized the "cruel and unu-
sual" clause as "progressive" and acquiring its " 'meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice' ". Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373-74, 378 (1910)). How-
ever, it is an anomoly to support this view, as the plurality did, with Judge Bork's statement that it is
a judge's task to "discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew,
apply to the world we know . . . in which unchanging values find their application." Id. (citing
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)). Judge Bork is saying, rather, that there is no modern age enlighten-
ment, but only a changing world context where unchanging values must be applied.
103. Id.
104. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 616 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion). The Court stated
that, "[a]lthough human lives are in the balance, it must be remembered that failure to allow flexibil-
ity may also jeopardize human lives-those of the victims of undeterred criminal conduct." Id. If
courts disregard victims in their assessment of the "evolving standards of decency," then the logical
terminus of this line of thought precludes all attempts to punish or deter criminal conduct.
105. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2981 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Id. Justice O'Connor dissented on this point, leaving a plurality of fourjustices. She stated
1989]
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future of proportionality analysis as applied to juvenile murderers is un-
certain. To determine the current standard of decency regarding the
death penalty for juveniles, the Supreme Court has looked at previous
sentencing decisions, sociological data and findings, current legislation
and legislative attitudes, jury verdicts, and judicial attitudes.'0 7
A. A Policy of Deference
Justice Powell once warned that the Court should not become the
ultimate arbiter on eighth amendment issues, but this was rather a legis-
lative responsibility. 0 8 In Coker v. Georgia, °9 the Court even refused to
look solely at what legislatures, bewildered as to the Court's unclear
holdings on cruel and unusual punishment, had refrained from doing. In
other words, the states' inaction since the Gregg decision, only one year
earlier, was still not cause for formulating sweeping constitutional inter-
pretations. The Coker Court embraced a federalist scheme, upholding
the policy of allowing state legislatures to experiment with both criminal
and civil laws within constitutional limitations. However, in Thompson,
a plurality did conjecture a minimum age of sixteen for imposition of the
death penalty based on indicators which were indefinitive as to any
"right" age." 0 Even though forty-seven state legislatures had, by various
means, arrived at a consensus of age fifteen or above for imposition of the
death penalty, the plurality was no longer content with deferring to the
that the Court was constitutionally obligated to engage in proportionality analysis regardless of their
assessment of the specific enactments of American legislatures. Id. at 2981.
107. In addressing the juvenile death penalty issue, the Court has addressed these areas in recent
decisions. However, in the most recent decision, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), the
dissenting justices in Thompson along with Justice Kennedy, who did not sit on that case, joined in a
plurality opinion which refused to rest constitutional law upon opinion polls, views of special interest
groups, and positions adopted by various professional associations. Such indicia are generally
tainted with bias. The plurality continued in its assault on the use of these indicia:
To say, as the dissent says, that 'it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth
Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty,' post, at 2986 (emphasis added),
quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) - and to mean the as the dissent
means it, i.e., that it is for us to judge, not on the basis of what we perceive the Eighth
Amendment originally prohibited, or on the basis of what we perceive the society through
its democratic processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the basis of what we
think 'proportionate' and 'measurably contributory to acceptable goals of punishment' -
to say and mean that, is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.
Id. at 2980.
108. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) ("The concerns
expressed in Furman that the death penalty not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously can be met by
a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information
and guidance .. ") Id. at 155.
109. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
110. Section III primarily addresses these objective yet indefinitive indicators.
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states on the age issue."'
As the state legislatures and judiciaries address the juvenile death
penalty issue, they must establish a sentencing process where the charac-
ter and moral guilt of the accused are consistently considered regardless
of the nature and brutality of the crime.' 12 In this context, the Supreme
Court stated in Eddings that "[j]ust as the chronological age of a minor
is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the back-
ground and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant
be duly considered in sentencing." '113 It then follows that mandatory re-
moval of youth as a relevant mitigating factor after the accused has at-
tained a certain age necessitates a presumption of "adulthood" and
precludes the sentencer from considering these concomitant characteris-
tics of youth.
The Supreme Court, in Bellotti v. Baird, 1 4 has already recognized
that state courts can competently ascertain the maturity level of a minor
to make the decision to abort." 5 The Court stated that
[E]very minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go di-
rectly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If
she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to
make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must
authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent."' 16
Bellotti recognizes that there are individual differences in juveniles' ma-
turity levels and age is not the sole determinant of one's maturity. The
process of determining the maturity requisite to allowing a minor to
choose abortion will undoubtedly vary from that requisite to determining
criminal culpability. Nevertheless, to establish a minimum age for im-
posing capital punishment runs counter to the ad hoe treatment which
Bellotti affords minors.
The Supreme Court enunciated as a general rule in Lockett v. Ohio
111. This figure includes all the states but the three that have no minimum age statutes or re-
quirements for youth as a mitigating factor.
112. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The rule in Lockett recognizes that the circum-
stances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender must be taken into
account.
113. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
114. 443 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
115. Id. at 643-44.
116. Id. at 647. The Supreme Court chose not to designate an age for the requirement of paren-
tal consent to have an abortion because it considered judges quite adept at determining if a girl is
mature enough to make the abortion decision on her own. It follows then, that the close relationship
between an adolescent's maturity level and culpability in crime should also lend itself to a judicial
rather than a chronological determination.
1989]
15
Petersen: Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Mitigating Circumstance of Youthful Cap
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
that "a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false
consistency." 1 7 On the juvenile death penalty issue as on the abortion
consent issue, the Court has recognized that juveniles possess varying
levels of maturity, not necessarily related to chronological age." 8 On a
case-by-case basis, the chronological bright line ignores individual differ-
ences and thus creates that false consistency which the Court cautions
against. If there is a danger of an arbitrary and capricious death penalty,
the Court's solution is offered in Gregg, namely, "a carefully drafted stat-
ute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate informa-
tion and guidance." ' 9 Such a statute must be drafted to insure that the
severity of the sentence is directly related to the culpability of the youth-
ful offender and not merely a reflection of the sentencer's emotional or
sympathetic response. 2
B. Retribution and Deterence
The notion that it is wrong to kill someone to solve a problem is a
postulate incompatible with man's survival instinct.' 2 ' Killing is some-
times necessary to preserve innocence and deter greater harms, whether
it be in the context of war, police work, self-defense, capital punishment,
ad infinitum.
Justice Black once stated "[r]etribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law."' 22 However, executions essential though
unappealing, are still required to appease society. 23 The Supreme Court
in Furman v. Georgia, expressed this belief in stating, "[if] organized soci-
ety is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punish-
ment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy ... " 124
But retribution must also be tempered in accord with "the dignity of
117. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112.
118. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). In Eddings, the Court stated that "youth
is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage." Id. (emphasis added).
119. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
120. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 540 (1987).
121. See V. STREB, supra note 19, at 188. Streib makes the statement: "[It is] wrong to kill
someone to solve a problem." Id. One need only witness our sometimes cruel and violent human
condition to justify numerous exceptions to the rule.
122. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
123. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). The Court re-
marked that, "the actions ofjuries in many States since Furman are fully compatible with the legisla-
tive judgments, reflected in the new statutes, as to the continued utility and necessity of capital
punishment in appropriate cases." Id. at 182.
124. 408 U.S. 238, 308 (Stewart, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
[Vol. 25:115
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man."' 25 This means that punishment should not be excessive and
should not unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain, 26 or be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.'27
The talisman of the retribution rationale is that the criminal sen-
tence must be related to the culpability of the offender."2 8 Because the
juvenile offender is "more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-
disciplined than [an] adult," his ability to form an intent to kill is
flawed. 2 9 Therefore, it follows that juveniles, like other irresponsible ac-
tors, e.g., retarded adults and the insane, do not deserve "harsh punish-
ment in the same way that mature adults might."' 30 While the adult has
had some time to develop socially redeeming qualities, the youthful of-
fender's lack of time essentially denies potentially lifesaving evidence to
the juvenile. t31
Studies are inconclusive as to the general deterrent value of the
death penalty for adults. 132 Furthermore, juvenile murderers have so
seldomly been executed that it would be next to impossible to determine
a deterrent value here. 133 Thus, the argument is that long-term impris-
onment is more than sufficient retribution, and in lieu of death, gives
juveniles the opportunity to become productive adults.' 34 Juvenile mur-
derers tend in fact to be model prisoners and have a very low rate of
125. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion).
126. Furman, 408 U.S. at 392-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
128. Respondent's Brief at 68-69, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169)
(citing Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1987)).
129. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982) (citing TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH
CRIME 7 (1978)).
130. See generally V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 35.
131. Ellison, State Execution ofJuveniles: Defining 'Youth' as a Mitigating Factor for Imposing a
Sentence of Less Than Death, 11 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 21, 33 (1987). Ellison presents a review
of the juvenile offender's impaired thought processes.
132. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). The Supreme
Court takes note of several studies which indicate that "each execution would save 'x' number of
lives." F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 182 (1984). The Court further concludes:
Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a
significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evi-
dence either supporting or refuting this view. We may nevertheless assume safely that
there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has
little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a signifi-
cant deterrent.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86.
133. See generally V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 190-208. Streib indicates that approximately
eighteen to twenty persons have been executed during the 20th century for crimes committed while
under the age of sixteen.
134. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 36-37.
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recidivism upon release. 135 Long term imprisonment also protects soci-
ety from further serious criminal acts by the offender.13 6
The Supreme Court, in Roberts v. Louisiana,'37 stated that "death
finally forecloses the possibility that a prisoner will commit further
crimes, whereas life imprisonment does not."13 But given the low rate
of recidivism following long prison terms, the threat of such a possibility
is significantly reduced. The suggestion in Eddings was that even though
only thirty percent of youths suffering from violent sociopathic and anti-
social personalities ever grow out of it, if intensively treated over a period
of years, most would no longer pose a threat to society.'
39
The Thompson plurality certainly views the juvenile death penalty
issue in the aforementioned perspective. However, whether or not long-
term imprisonment is an acceptable alternative is not the issue in Thomp-
son. The fact is that adolescents may be executed in Oklahoma at this
time and the matter of setting an age minimum of sixteen is problematic
in that the upper age limit of adolescence varies from person to person. 140
C. "Choosing" to Kill
In Thompson, the state's singular focus is on the marked cruelty of
the killing which "manifests adultlike maturity and sophistication of an
adult mind."'' One critic challenging this reasoning has observed,
"[e]ven the toddler can discharge a firearm and kill an intended victim
.. pull the lever in the voting booth .... or take a sip of beer."' 142 After
135. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 36-37. See also Vitello, Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile
Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States, 26 DEPAuL L. REv. 23, 32-34
(1976).
136. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 36-37.
137. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
138. Id. at 354 (White, J., dissenting); See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (White, J.,
concurring), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
139. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1982). Besides offering the possibility of reha-
bilitation, Streib urges that long term imprisonment may very well be more of a deterrent than the
death penalty. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 188. This premise dictates that the adolescent's fear of
being locked up for a long time would more likely than not enter the calculation to kill. Whereas the
adolescent's perceived immortality, an element of adolescent egocentrism, supercedes any fear of
being put to death that might enter the calculation to kill.
140. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-03 (1978). The plurality opinion quoted Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 961 (1949) stating that "the sentencing
judge's 'possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteris-
tics' is '[h]ighly relevant - if not essential - [to the] selection of an appropriate sentence," age; for
imposition of the death penalty forecloses a judge's consideration of youthful characteristics where
the offender is one day older than the minimum age. Id.
141. Brief of Amici Curiae for Respondent, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)
(No. 86-6169).
142. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 184.
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all, these too are adult and sometimes criminal acts. When a sentencer
focuses on a heinous or cruel killing to the exclusion of the young of-
fender's typically impaired cognitive ability,' 43 the sentencer will be more
inclined to impose the death penalty.
Adult-like maturity and sophistication of thought are the sine qua
non of the guilty mind and not solely manifestations of the juvenile's
criminal act. Therefore, the sentencer must focus on the adolescent's
thought process, not as a manifestation of the criminal act, but as a par-
tial cause of it. Oklahoma's emphasis on the cruelty of the act precludes
any reasonable consideration of youthful impulse as a mitigating
factor.'44
The predominant sociological theory of adolescent cognitive ability
postulates that egocentrism often incapacitates the adolescent's thought
processes to a significant degree.' 4  Adolescent egocentrism manifests
itself in a variety of aberrant behaviors. For instance, the adolescent will
often boldly defy danger and even death.' 46 This false sense of power
compounded with youth's lack of experience, perspective, and judgment
to avoid fateful choices can have catastrophic consequences for crimi-
nally inclined adolescents and their victims. If the death penalty deters
murder, then only those who carefully contemplate it prior to their crim-
inal acts will possibly be deterred. But adolescents are generally incapa-
ble of contemplating the risk of their own death resulting from their
criminal behavior.147
143. See generally Ellison, supra note 131, at 27-31 (1987). This source provides a capsulized
version of adolescent egocentrism and how the sentencer should consider it during the sentencing
process. Adolescent egocentrism is derived from Piagetian theory and expounded on in Muuss, So-
cial Cognition: David Elkind's Theory of Adolescent Egocentrism, 17 ADOLESCENCE 249, (1982);
Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1025 (1967). The early adolescent
typically enters a period of operational thought which permits him to conceptualize his own
thoughts as well as the thoughts of others. Unfortunately, the adolescent is not yet able to differenti-
ate between objects toward which others direct their thoughts. Therefore, adolescent egos assume
the world is as obsessed with their behavior as they are. This false perception is better known as the
"imaginary audience." Id. at 28-29 (citing excerpts from Elkind and Muuss).
144. See generally Petitioner's Brief at 30-34, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)
(No. 86-6169).
145. Ellison, supra note 131, at 29-30. One aspect of adolescent egocentrism is the "personal
fable" in which adolescents view themselves as special or unique. The destructive component of the
personal fable is the adolescent's defiance of danger and death which ensues from a sense of divine
omnipotence. Taking life for granted, the adolescent believes that bad things happen only to others.
In choosing to engage in crime, the threat of a policeman's bullet or the more remote electric chair
prematurely ending one's life never enters the adolescent's calculation.
146. Ellison, supra note 131, at 29-30.
147. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979). Cf Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (juveniles have a lack of judgment in considering the consequences of
their actions); V. STRIEB, supra note 19, at 37. -[J]uveniles do not commonly engage in any 'cold
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As adolescents mature, they decenter off themselves, and their abil-
ity to make mature and rational decisions increases. '1 The post-adoles-
cent is then better able to weigh the detrimental consequences of criminal
behavior in the calculation to commit or not to commit a crime. But
until this time, the effects of egocentrism must be explained in detail to
the jury or considered by the judge during the juvenile's sentencing pro-
cess. 14 9 Without such consideration, the sentencer, much like Thomp-
son's sentencing jury, is left with only the aggravating circumstances of
the murder to dwell upon. The sentencer might even view the juvenile as
a greater threat to society and be inclined to punish more harshly.
The abatement of this "cognitive impairment" cannot be chronolog-
ically determined with the precision a sentencer requires where life hangs
in the balance.'I " Adolescent egocentrism, according to one study, is as
calculus that precedes the decision to act.'" (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (Stewart, J.,
plurality), 186, reh 'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
148. Ellison, supra note 131, at 30-31.
149. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.ll (1982). This footnote is an excerpt from a
government-funded study which states:
[A]dolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable,
more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be
just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less pun-
ishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think
in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the of-
fender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social
system, which share responsibility for development of America's youth.
Id. (citing TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG
OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978)).
150. Id. at 116 ("just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of
great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defend-
ant be duly considered in sentencing."); See also Respondent's Brief at 40-41, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169). The Respondent's Brief cited several arguments
against such a chronological determination as follows:
It is recognized that some youths handled by juvenile courts are hardened, dangerous
offenders, while some adults older than the arbitrary upper age level are emotionally and
sometimes physically immature individuals.... No chronological age bracket is uniformly
identical or entirely homogenous.
Id. at 40 (citing THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 119-20 (1967)).
An arbitrary age limit below which the death penalty should never be imposed would
be almost impossible to determine with certainty. Many persons who have no objection to
executing a youth of sixteen would be horrified at the thought of executing a ten-year-old.
Further, if the cutoff age were, for example, to be seventeen years, a hardened and sophisti-
cated sixteen-year-old would escape the death penalty while an immature and impulsive
seventeen-year-old would not. Chronological age is an inherently poor criterion by which to
determine actual maturity.
Id. at 4041 (emphasis original) (citing Hill, Can the Death Penalty be Imposed on Juveniles: The
Unanswered Question in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 26 (1984)), Even a govern-
ment report opposing the death sentence for juveniles stated " 'no single age during mid-adolescence
should be used as a sharp dividing line for sentencing policies.'" Id. at 41 (citing TWENTIETH
20
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much related to a person's level of formal operations as it is a function of
age.' 5 1 Furthermore, different school environments, gender, racial heri-
tage and the social context surrounding race, and home environment
may each have as much influence on egocentrism as age.152
D. Legislative Enactments
The dominant tradition that children are not assumed to be respon-
sible for themselves is reflected in our laws.t 53 The status laws discrimi-
nating by age include voting, contracting, purchasing liquor, suing or
being sued, disposing of property by will, serving as jurors, enlisting in
the armed forces, driving vehicles, marrying, and accepting employ-
ment.'54 Such laws insure that youngsters receive the "special treat-
ment" they deserve.' 55
These legislative enactments have a more practical function as well.
Within the general population, aspects of adolescent immaturity often
spill over into the early twenties. Likewise, aspects of adult maturity
begin to appear in the adolescent years. For example, there are some
politically astute sixteen-year-olds in this country who are better in-
formed to vote than most adults, yet are prohibited. Similar analogies
can be made regarding the rest of the status laws. Governments, how-
ever, are ill-equipped to ascertain the abilities of millions of teenagers to
CENTURY TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS CONFRONTING
YOUTH CRIME 5 (1978)).
151. Riley, Adams, & Nielsen, Adolescent Egocentrism: The Association Among Imaginary Audi-
ence Behavior, Cognitive Development, and Parental Support and Rejection, 13 J. YOUTH & ADOLES-
CENCE 401, 402 (1984).
152. Id. at 403. Various studies have indicated adolescent egocentrism to be a function of a
number of various environmental factors, any one of which might be a primary determinant of
adolescent egocentrism in a young person. The dominance of a single factor or a combination of
factors could carry over into young adulthood.
153. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) ("Our history is replete with laws
and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and
responsible than adults."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ("Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically trans-
ferred to determination of a State's duty towards children.").
154. The Supreme Court has articulted the purposes behind such status laws as follows:
We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
155. Petitioner's Brief at 24, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169).
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distinguish those physically, mentally, and emotionally capable of assum-
ing responsibilities as capable and reasonably prudent persons. The stat-
utes, while greatly reducing the government's burden to ascertain
maturity levels, sometimes deny privileges to those who deserve them
and grant privileges to those who do not.'56
Statutory presumptions based on age are conclusive. 57 But such
presumptions must give way where governments endeavor to enforce
laws against criminal offenders.' An age-based death penalty statute
unjustly denies the mitigating factor of youth to less mature offenders
who are older than the specified age, even if by one day. It likewise
grants the redeeming factor to more mature offenders who are under the
specified age. The magnitude of the life-or-death decision compels the
sentencer always to consider mitigating factors when the evidence
presents them.'59 The spillover effect of a status law may present an un-
acceptable margin of error which runs counter to the exacting standard
set forth in Gregg.6 '
Another possible objective indicator of society's attitude regarding
the juvenile death penalty is the juvenile death penalty statutes them-
selves.16 ' Legislative attitudes to the death penalty for minors have
156. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2977 (1989) ("[the age-statutes] do not represent
a social judgment that all persons under the designated ages are not responsible enough to drive, to
drink, or to vote, but at most a judgment that the vast majority are not."). Id. (emphasis added).
157. Brief of Amici Curiae for Respondent at 13, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687
(1988) (No. 86-6169). Regarding the more practical purpose for these laws, the brief states that "the
government could not very well be expected to conduct a trial-type hearing, complete with the op-
portunity for exhaustive appellate review, every time a twelve-year-old thought he was mature
enough to begin voting or driving a car." Id.
158. Id.
159. V. STREM, supra note 19, at 27.
160. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). The Court
stressed that trial judges have accurate information about both defendant and crime, and that "accu-
rate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a
defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing deci-
sion." Id. See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2977-78 (1989) ("[The age-statutes do]
not conduct individualized maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or voter. The criminal justice
system, however, does provide individualized testing). Id.
161. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92. In Gregg, the Court recommends a bifurcated sentencing proce-
dure, such as that employed by Georgia, to better insure that exacting standards of fourteenth
amendment due process are maintained. This procedure will preclude the information required for
the sentencing procedure from prejudicing the question of guilt. The idea is to abide strictly by the
rules until and unless there is a conviction, and only then allow in additional information relevant to
sentencing. Id. (dictum). Florida has gone one step further in establishing a trifurcated procedure
consisting of: (I) determination of guilt or innocence by a jury; (2) an advisory sentence by the jury;
(3) an actual sentence imposed by the trial judge; and (4) review of the sentence by the Florida
Supreme Court. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-250 (1976). However, in adhering to the
deferrence principle, the Supreme Court has stated, "[w]e are unwilling to say that there is any one
way for a State to set up its capital punishment scheme." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464
22
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changed since 1962 when there were forty-one death penalty states with
ages down to seven.162 Today, fourteen states have abolished capital
punishment altogether.1 63 The eighteen legislatures that have expressly
considered the question have set a minimum age for capital punishment
at sixteen or above. 164 This leaves nineteen states that authorize capital
punishment without setting any statutory minimum age for the death
penalty.' 65 However, of these, twelve have established minimum ages
ranging from ten to fifteen in their waiver statutes.1 66 Even considering
the states with the minimum criminal court age, this does not alter the
fact that nineteen legislatures have authorized capital punishment at
either staggered minimums from age fifteen to ten or have enacted no
minimum age laws at all. 16
7
With thirty-nine percent of the states not statutorily committed to a
minimum age for capital punishment of sixteen or above, there is an in-
sufficient national legislative consensus for prohibiting capital punish-
ment at any specific age. This is not to say that the lower age waiver
statutes are dispositive of legislative intent to allow execution of ten- to
fifteen-year-olds. Rather, the legislative intent of these nineteen states
cannot be sufficiently determined to confirm the existence of a national
consensus on how old a youthful offender need be at the time of murder
to be eligible for execution.
The Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, erred once before in sug-
gesting there might be a societal consensus rejecting the death penalty.'68
(1984). It is a discouraging commentary on the Oklahoma Legislature that, given the Gregg recom-
mendation of a bifurcated sentencing process in 1976, it has failed to establish such a process. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.10-701.15 (1981 & Supp. 1988). As of January, 1989, there were 97
death row inmates in Oklahoma with the last execution having occurred in the 1960s. Tulsa World,
Jan. 26, 1989, at A-I, col. 1. These inmates are involved in the lengthy appeals process. At least
some of these inmates were caught up in Oklahoma's unitary system which fails to function in a
consistent and rational manner. This malfunction is a special problem for young criminals when
compounded by the fact that the Oklahoma Legislature has not enacted laws to consider youth as a
mitigating circumstance. One need only witness Thompson, a virtual repeat of Eddings five years
earlier, to realize that the Oklahoma Legislature has not yet heeded the Supreme Court's message
that the State's death penalty statutes require substantial revision.
162. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 26.
163. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2694 (1988). See supra note 2 and accompanying
text for listing.
164. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2695-96. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas. Id.
165. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for list of statutes.
166. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
168. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (Douglas, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 409 U.S.
902 (1972). Actually, all concurring opinions inferred a societal consensus as evidenced by the rarity
of the death sentence which indicates its arbitrary imposition.
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Following the decision, thirty-five state legislatures stampeded to reenact
their death penalty statutes.1 69 This was a panic response to the threat
which Furman posed to the constitutionality of the death penaltyt70 as
well as a marked indication of society's endorsement of the death pen-
alty.1 7 1 In the 1950s and 1960s, many states had abolished or radically
restricted capital punishment and executions had ceased completely be-
ginning in 1968.171 Justice O'Connor describes what would have tran-
spired had the Supreme Court actually inferred a societal consensus in
this way:
But had this Court then declared the existence of such a consensus,
and outlawed capital punishment, legislatures would very likely not
have been able to revive it. The mistaken premise of the decision
would have been frozen into constitutional law, making it difficult to
refute and even more difficult to reject. 173
In the Furman era, it was clear that the legislatures, and not the
Supreme Court or state judiciaries, had the firmer grasp on societal con-
sensus. 74 And again in Thompson, the Court did not have sufficient em-
pirical evidence to support finding a legislative consensus and risk the
consequences of ruling on a mistaken premise.1
75
E. Other Objective Indicators Suggest No Consensus
A 1965 Gallup poll showed that 45% of respondents supported cap-
ital punishment but only 23% supported it for persons under twenty-one
years of age. 176 This latter figure was about ten percentage points higher
169. Comment, Thompson v. Oklahoma: A Special Place in Society for Juveniles; Does It Include
Death Row?, 9 CRIM. JusT. J. 371, 385 (1987).
170. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 409 U.S.
902 (1972) (In criticizing Ohio's death penalty statutes, Justice Douglas stated that they were "preg-
nant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments"). Id. Six
justices held the statutes to be unconstitutional, raising the spectre of a future ruling outlawing
capital punishment altogether.
171. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) ("The most
marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative re-
sponse to Furman'). Id.
172. V. STRrIB, supra note 19, at 25.
173. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2709 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-81.
175. The lack of empirical evidence is apparent from the fact that Thompson only offers a plural-
ity opinion. Justice O'Connor did posit that "[t]he day may come when ... we shall have to decide
the Eighth Amendment issue that divides the plurality and the dissent in this case, and we shall have
to evaluate the evidence of societal standards of decency that is available to us at that time." Thomp-
son, 108 S. Ct. at 2710 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 33 (citing Erskine, The Polls: Capital Punishment, 34 Pun.
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in two recent regional surveys. 177 Although the juvenile death penalty is
most certainly opposed by the majority, the surveys suggest there is still a
strong minority favoring it. Furthermore, the percentage may well be
higher in those locales favoring capital punishment in general. Inferring
a "national consensus" in this instance would effectively prescribe one
region's preferences over another's.
Low death sentencing and execution statistics have been viewed as
an objective indicator of societal consensus on the juvenile death penalty
issue.178 Of seventy people executed in the post Furman era, only three
were under the age of eighteen at the time of trial.1 79 Even though the
death row population had increased by 42% from December 1983 to
March 1987, the juvenile death row population decreased by 16%.180
The trend since 1982 has been to impose fewer death sentences on
juveniles.' Also, the commutation rate for youth on death row has al-
ways been high.'8 2 These findings, rather than indicating a need for a
national age minimum for imposing the death penalty, more properly
indicate the states have practically resolved the bright line issue already.
In other words, the Supreme Court's policy of deferring to the states has
been largely successful.
Commentators have argued that statistical trends are indicative of
society's consensus on the need for a national minimum age for the impo-
sition of the death sentence.'8 3 But the percentage of juvenile executions
in the 1980s has actually been higher than at any other period during this
century.' 8 4 Also, it is unclear if judges and juries are becoming more
reluctant to impose the death sentence as the statistical trends might sug-
gest. Hidden factors such as successful plea-bargaining, executive par-
dons, procedural and evidentiary error, and decisions not to waiver
OPINION Q. 290 (1970), as cited in Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1974)).
177. V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 34.
178. See e.g., Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2697 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 249, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). Brief of Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Association and
Others as amici curiae for Petitioner at 25 n.32, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)
(No. 86-6169).
179. Brief of Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Association and Others as amici curiae for Petitioner
at 23-24; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169).
180. Id. at 24. The downward trend has been as follows: 1982-11, 1983-9, 1984-6, 1985-3,
1986-7. Id.
181. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey: 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25 (1964).
182. Respondent's Brief at 85, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No.86-6169).
183. See, e.g., V. STREIB, supra note 19, at 24-25; Gersten, supra note 1, at 113-14.
184. Brief of Petitioner at app. C, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No.86-6169).
The percentages range from a low of 0% to a high of 4.5% during the years 1980-87. Only one other
decade registers over 3%, 1940-49 at 4.1%.
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youthful offenders may affect trends as much as any societal consensus
on the issue.' 85
The plurality justices in Thompson claim international "standards of
decency" are highly persuasive on the establishment of a minumum age
statute.'8 6 The plurality opinion goes so far as to suggest that the United
States may even be under an obligation to establish a rigid standard.' 8 7
Former President Carter signed the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in 1977.1' This document, prohibiting capital punish-
ment for persons who committed crimes while under eighteen, has yet to
be ratified by the Senate.'8 9 This treaty was not made under the author-
ity of the United States and is therefore not binding on its citizens.' 90
The fact that other democracies have minimum age laws for impos-
ing the death penalty is mildly persuasive at best. 191 The dissenting jus-
tices in Thompson best stated the principle involved as follows:
But where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people,
the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans
through the Constitution. In the present case, therefore, the fact that a
majority of foreign nations would not impose capital punishment upon
persons under 16 at the time of the crime is of no more relevance than
the fact that a majority of them would not impose capital punishment
185. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2977 (1989) (plurality) ("[i]t is not only possible
but overwhelmingly probably that the very considerations which induce petitioners and their sup-
porters to believe that the death should never be imposed on offenders under 18 cause prosecutors
and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed [emphasis in original]). Id.
186. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2696.
187. Id. at n.34. Three human rights treaties are mentioned as explicitly prohibiting juvenile
death penalties. Of these, only one, Article 68 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, was ever ratified by the United States. Id.
188. Comment, Thompson v. Oklahoma: A Special Place in Society For Juveniles; Does It In-
clude Death Row?, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 371, 378 n.42 (1987).
189. Id.
190. See R. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214
(1986) (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920)):
It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are
limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of
Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty
cannot do.
Id. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ("It would be manifestly ... alien to our entire
constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exer-
cise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions.").
191. Our Constitution is not only the oldest and most durable in existence today, but was
uniquely conceived and has stood as the premier model in drafting the constitutions of western
democracies. The United States and British Commonwealth nations also share a very unique com-
mon law. To interject what might be one world of legal mandates, such as the death penalty, gun
control, or various civil rights law into our statutory scheme may undermine the common law un-
derpinnings of our legal system and prove to be unconstitutional as well.
[Vol. 25:115
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The Court continues to adhere to a process-oriented approach in
that it will defer to the states' legislatures and judiciaries which must
insure that youth is considered during the young offender's sentencing
process. This process-oriented approach will not always keep fifteen-
year-old offenders off death row, this being the substantive result which
the Thompson plurality desires. Conversely, it is a fiction to believe that
the more conspicuous fifteen-year-old, as a matter of age, is always less
culpable than the sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen-year-old offenders
alongside him on death row. Thus, the chronological bright line creates
a false consistency which achieves a substantive result less likely to shock
the abolitionist conscience only because of the certainty that no fifteen-
year-old offender will be found on death row. The substantive approach,
while precisely equating youthful culpability to commit murder as a
function of chronological age, abandons older offenders who may actu-
ally be more immature and therefore less culpable. The Thompson deci-
sion, therefore, rightfully retains a policy of deferring to the states to
establish and implement judicial procedures to insure that youth is con-
sidered as a mitigating factor in sentencing juvenile murderers. In Stan-
ford, the Court reemphasized that, "it is not demonstrable that no 16-
year-old is 'adequately responsible' or significantly deterred. It is ra-
tional, even if mistaken, to think the contrary."'
' 93
In Thompson, the jury was never instructed to consider Wayne
Thompson's youth as a factor possibly mitigating his punishment. The
Supreme Court justifiably reversed the judgment for this reason. How-
ever, due to the extreme polarization between the plurality and dissent on
the juvenile death penalty issue, the states were left with no practical
guidance as how best to insure that youth is considered as a mitigating
factor during the sentencing process. Addressing the adult death penalty
in 1976, the Court recommended a bifurcated sentencing process to
guard against arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.
However, after twelve years, the Oklahoma Legislature has still not en-
acted the appropriate statutes to effect such a process and greatly reduce
the likelihood that youth or any other mitigating circumstance might not
192. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716-17 n.4 (1988) (dissenting opinion).
193. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979 (1989) (plurality) (emphasis added).
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be considered during the sentencing process. The Supreme Court rever-
sals in Thompson, and its predecessor Eddings, clearly signal a need for
the Oklahoma Legislature to overhaul its death penalty statutes.
Finally, the Supreme Court would do well to establish additional
guidelines, beyond bifurcation, to assist states in insuring that youth is
treated as a highly relevant mitigating factor in the sentencing process.
Nineteen states have clearly rejected a minimum age statute as the means
of accounting for youth during the sentencing process. Given guidance,
these states might then better establish or refine their juvenile death pen-
alty statutes and sentencing procedures. Such guidance would ultimately
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